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THE CITY CLEARING HOUSE: PAYMENT,
RETURNS, AND REIMBURSEMENT
FLETCHER R. ANDREWS*

This is the fourth of a series of articles about the city clearing
house.' The first article contains a description of the clearing operation
which takes place at the clearing house. 2 There the checks and other
items are exchanged by the member banks, after which the representative
of each bank brings to his bank the items drawn upon it. At the
drawee bank the items are examined to determine whether they will'
be hionored or dishonored. Among other things, the bank examines
the drawer's signature for possible forgery, and the state of the drawer's
to see
account for the possibility of insufficient funds. It also looks
3
check.
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whether payment
It is obvious that provision must be made for the return of items
which the drawee bank wishes to dishonor, and the various clearing
house regulations cover the subject of returns 'and reimbursement in
detail. 4 The time for returning items is generally specified in the clearing
house regulations.5
It has been argued that banks have no right to return items once
they have been exchanged at the clearing house. The argument is based
upon the theory that the exchanges at the clearing house constitute final
payment of the item. The fallacy of the argument becomes apparent
*A.B., 19i6, Dartmouth College; LL.B., 1925, Western Reserve University; J.S.D.,
1941, Yale University; Dean, School of Law, Western Reserve University.
1. The other articles, all by the present writer, are The Operation of the City

Clearing House, 51 YALE L.J. 582 (1942) ; Validity and Time of Presentment Through
The Clearing House, 1 WESTERN REs. L. REv. 97 (1949), 68 BANKING L.J. 557 (1951) ;
The City Clearig House: Problems Concerning Noumembers, 2 WESTERN RES. L. REv.
109 (1950), 68 BANKING L.J. 395 (1951).
2. Andrews, The Operation of the City Clearing House, 51 YALE L.J. 582, 590

(1942).
3. Andrews, supra note 2, at 598.

4. Ibid.
5. The comparatively recent statutes on deferred posting and delayed returns will
be referred to later. Before their adoption, the deadline for returning dishonored items
was generally a specified hour in the afternoon of the day when the items were received.
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upon consideration of the fact that no opportunity is afforded at the
clearing house for the examination of the items exchanged. They remain
in their envelopes or packages and, unopened, are brought to the drawee
bank by its messenger, where, for the first time, the individual items are
checked and the state of the drawer's account investigated. To hold that
the debits and credits at the clearing house constitute final, irrevocable
payment, precluding the return of so-called "not good" items, would
result in gross injustice and would evidence a complete failure to comprehend the purposes and methods of the clearing routine. Fortunately,
the courts take no such absurd position; instead, they hold, with practical unanimity, that the debits and credits at the clearing house are
merely provisional and do not constitute payment.
A glance at some typical factual situations raising the issue will
lead to a clearer understanding of its significance. The most obvious
case arises from the refusal of the bank which presented the item to take
it back and reimburse the drawee. This results in a suit by the drawee
against the presenting bank for the amount of the check. Since, by
hypothesis, the drawee tendered the item within the time designated
by the clearing house rule, the presenting bank will lose.6
More interesting is an action by the presenting bank against the
payee-indorser, brought upon the theory that the check has been dishonored, as a consequence of which the indorser must pay it. Here,
the presenting bank has refunded the amount of the check to the drawee,
and seeks reimbursement from the indorser. The latter contends that
since the clearing house transaction constituted payment, he has been
discharged. 7 In conformity with the rule stated above, the courts hold
8
the indorser liable.
Another interesting factual situation involved a suit by the administratrix of a deceased depositor in the drawee bank for the amount
alleged to be on deposit. The drawee claimed to have paid out the deposit
before the depositor's death. The evidence disclosed that the checks in
question went through the clearing house, were dishonored by the drawee,
and were returned to the presenting bank, which refunded the amount
to the drawee. The court very properly held that the clearing house
6. National Exchange Bank v. National Bank of North America, 132 Mass. 147
(1882), is in point, although it contains some rather unfortunate language about the
effect of the clearing transaction. As might be expected, the factual situation under
consideration has not given rise to much litigation.
7. This would follow from § 120 of the Negotiable Instruments Law provided the
check had been paid.
8. Columbia-Knickerbocker Trust Co. v. Miller, 215 N.Y. 191, 109 N.E. 179 (1915);
Hooker v. Franklin, 2 Bos. 500 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1858).
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transaction was not payment, although the amount of the checks was

credited there to the presenting bank. 9
Several of the cases involved suits by the payee or other owner of
the item against the drawee, brought upon the theory that since the
events at the clearing house constitute payment, the owner's right to
the sum represented by the check has become fixed. In view of the rule
that no payment has occurred, the owner will not recover. 10
From the situations presented, it is seen that the courts consistently
follow the rule that no payment results from the exchanges at the clearing house. And the mere fact that the drawee has paid its clearing house
balance prior to the "return" time, in accordance with the association's
rules, does not change the result."" This is inevitable, for the clearing
house balances are arrived at on the basis of the items exchanged, with2
out regard to their subsequent honor or dishonor by the drawee bank.'
More difficult is the problem of discovering what constitutes payment after the clearing house checks have reached the drawee bank. The
clearing house situation is more readily understood by a prior consideration of so-called over-the-counter transactions. In the latter, the
holder of the check is a customer of the drawee bank and deposits the
check in that bank, receiving either cash or credit. It is evident that when
the depositor takes cash, the check is paid, and payment cannot be
9. Sneider v. Bank of Italy, 184 Cal. 595, 194 Pac. 1021 (1920). An analogous
situation was present in People v. Munday, 293 Ill. 191, 127 N.E. 364 (1920), a criminal
case involving the trial of a bank official for receiving deposits knowing of the bank's
insolvency. In the Sneider case the court held immaterial the fact that the drawee had
mistakenly checked the wrong reason for returning the items. Inasmuch as the check
has not been paid, the drawee may return it for any reason at all. Campbell v. Love,
168 Miss. 75, 150 So. 780 (1933) (drawer insolvent) ; Eastman Kodak Co. v. National
Park Bank, 231 Fed. 320 (S.D. N.Y. 1916), aff'd without opinion, 247 Fed. 1002 (2d Cir.
1917) (mistake about instructions to pay).
10. Grosner v. First Nat. Bank, 5 F. Supp. 468 (E.D. Mich. 1933) ; Eastman Kodak
Co. v. National Park Bank, 231 Fed. 320 (S.D. N.Y. 1916), aff'd without ophtion., 247
Fed. 1002 (2d Cir. 1917) ; Campbell v. Love, 168 Miss. 75, 150 So. 780 (1933) ; Hentz v.
National City Bank, 159 App. Div. 743, 144 N.Y. Supp. 979 (1st Dep't 1913). It should
be noted that if a check has been paid by credit, the plaintiff's action is not upon the
check, but upon the debt arising from the debtor-creditor relationship. See Aigler, Rights
of Holder of Bill of Exchange Against the Drawee, 38 HARv. L. REv. 857, 873 (1925);
80 U. OF PA. L. REv. 740, 741 (1932).
11. The point is mentioned in the Hentz case, supra note 10.
12. The following cases also recognize that clearing house proceedings do not
effect payment of the items exchanged: Security-First Nat. Bank v. Bank of America
Nat. Trust & Savings Ass'n, 22 Cal.2d 154, 137 P.2d 452 (1943); National Bank of
North America v. Bangs, 106 Mass. 441 (1871); Merchants' Nat. Bank v. National
Eagle Bank, 101 Mass. 281 (1869); State Bank v. Weiss and Rubin, 46 Misc. 93, 91
N.Y. Supp. 276 (Sup.Ct 1904); see 22 BANKING L.J. 167 (1905). But cf. National
Union Bank v. Earle, 93 Fed. 330 (E.D. Pa. 1899), criticized 1 y Judge L. Hand in
Eastman Kodak Co. v. National Park Bank, supra note 10, at 325. For a case concerning
zllegedly conflicting rules in connection with "returns," see Mount Morris Bank y.
Twenty-Third Ward Bank, 172 N.Y. 244, 64 N.E. 810 (1902).
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revoked. 13 But the clearing house transaction bears a closer resemblance
to the over-the-counter credit transaction than to the cash transaction.
In each of these credit routines, credit is given to the person presenting
the check, and in each instance the drawee bank, having later discovered
something the matter with the check, as, for example, that it is an overdraft, wishes to revoke the credit. Consequently, despite dissimilarities
which will become apparent when the clearing house decisions are discussed, the over-the-counter credit transaction provides helpful background material in the solution of the clearing house cases.' 4
It is to be noted that we are not dealing with the question of acceptance or certification of a check. Acceptance is a promise to pay,
whereas the question with which we are concerned is whether the check
has ,been paid. A lawsuit involving this question will not be brought
upon the check, but rather upon the debt arising from the alleged payment of the check and the consequent debtor-creditor relationship between the bank and the presenting depositor. 15
When the check has finally been "paid," the drawee bank is not
permitted to revoke the payment, although under certain conditions
based for the most part upon mistake of fact, it may be entitled to
reimbursement.' 6 On the other hand, if the acts performed by the bank
fall short of payment, the bank has not become a debtor to the depositor
and can successfully resist the latter's claim. Thus, it becomes important
to determine the point at which payment is effected.
Authorities have called attention to the confused state of the decisions concerning many of the questions relating to payment. 1 7 Fundamentally, the question of whether payment by credit has occurred
13. Note, 50 COL. L. REV. 802, 818 (1950). Blt cf. Citizens State Bank v. Pritchett,
231 P.2d 462 (Colo. 1951).
14. Cases where checks are forwarded for collection and remittance are not
analogous and will not be considered. The only "remittance" which the clearing house
drawee makes is payment of its clearing house debit balance, if any, and that is based
upon the provisional entries made at the time of the clearings and does not operate as
payment of any particular check. Nor is the amount of the balance due affected by
the subsequent discovery of some "not good" checks. The .distinction between the
remittance and credit cases is referred to in Hunt v. Security State Bank, 91 Ore. 362,

369, 179 Pac. 248, 251 (1919).
15. Bryan v. First Nat. Bank, 205 Pa. 7, 54 Atl. 480 (1903) ; Schaer v. First Nat.
Bank, 132 Tex. 499, 124 S.W.2d 108 (1939); Aigler, Rights of Holder of Bill of
Exchange Against the Drawee, 38 HARV. L. REv. 857, 878 (1925) ; 6 U. OF CIN. L. Rlv.

238 (1932).
16. This matter 'Will be treated subsequently. A frequent type of mistake of fact
arises from a forged indorsement, believed by both parties to be genuine.
17. 2 MORSE, BANKS AND BANKING 1217 (6th ed. 1928) ; Turner, Bank CollectionsThe Direct Routing Practice, 39 YALE L.J. 468, 479 (1930) ; Wallace, CoMments on the
Proposed Uniform Check Collection Code, 16 VA. L. REv. 792, 803 (1930); 30 ILL.
B.J. 157 (1941) ; 30 MIcE. L. REv. 962 (1932); Note, 15 A.LR. 709 (1921).
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depends upon the intent of the parties as manifested by their words and
actions.' s This being so, it might be argued that the question is one of
fact for, the jury and therefore presents no problem of law at all.
However, in questions of ultimate fact, as opposed to evidentiary facts,
courts frequently adopt definite standards or rules, so that if certain
facts are present, only one ultimate conclusion may be drawn. The
question of payment of a check is admirably suited to this technique.
Businessmen are entitled to as much certainty as possible in such an
important matter. The bank and the depositor' should not be forced to
depend upon the.vagaries of a jury, nor should they be subjected to the
evil of divergent verdicts upon exactly the same facts. Fortunately, the
courts tend to follow the suggested procedure in many of the payment
problems,' 9 thus reducing to some degree of order an otherwise chaotic
condition.
In the over-the-counter transaction, there is the following typical
situation. The customer deposits the check in question, and receives
credit in his passbook or on a deposit slip. Later in the day the bookkeeping department discovers that the drawer's account does not contain
sufficient funds. The bank then attempts to revoke the credit. 20 Most
courts hold that the bank may not do so, since the facts constitute payment. 2 It is said to be as truly a payment as though the bank had handed
18. E. g., National Bank v. Burkhardt, 100 U.S. 686 (1879) ; Citizens State Bank
v. Pritchett, 231 P.2d 462 (Colo. 1951); Oddie v. National City Bank, 45 N.Y. 735
(1871); 30 MicH. L. REv. 962, 963 (1932); 80 U. OF PA. L. Rv. 740 (1932). In the
Oddie case the court, at page 741, states the proposition in the following language:
"In determining the legal effect of such transactions, we must apply the same rules
applicable to all contracts and business affairs, and effectuate and carry out the intenti6n of the parties, to be gathered from their acts and declarations, and the accustomed and understood course of the particular business."
19. This will be apparent from the subsequent discussion of what constitutes payment. For a good case wherein the court told the jury that under certain undisputed
facts payment existed, see Bryan v. First Nat Bank, 205 Pa. 7, 54 Atl. 480 (1903).
Two cases indicating that payment is a question entirely for the jury are unsatisfactory
in that they fail to point out the nature of the trial court's instructions to the jury.
National Bank v. Burkhardt, 100 U.S. 686 (1879) ; Guardian Nat. Bank v. Huntington
County State Bank, 206 Ind. 185, 187 N.E. 388 (1933). Any authority which the former

case may have possessed on the point disappears in view of American Nat. Bank v.
Miller, Agent, 229 U.S. 517 (1913) holding that certain facts operated as payment
as a matter of law.
20. Of course, for a responsible drawer the bank may let the overdraft go through.
In that case no problem arises. If the bookkeeper finds the account overdrawn, the
check is often put "in suspense" with the idea that the drawer's account may be sufficiently increased during the day to cover the amount of the check. Another variation
occurs where the drawer's account is sufficient to absorb the check, but is depleted
during the day by the return of some "not good" items.
21. First Nat. Bank v. McKeen, 197 Ark. 1060, 127 S.W.2d 142 (1939); National
Deposit Bank v. Ohio Oil Co., 250 Ky. 288, 62 S.W.2d 1048 (1933); Sowers Co. v.
First Nat. Bank, 6 La. App. 721 (1927); Schutte v. Citizens Bank, 3 La. App. 547
(1926) ;W. A. White Brokerage Co. v. Cooperman, 207 Minn. 239, 290 N.W. 790 (1940) ;
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the money to the payee and immediately received it back as a cash
deposit. 22 Whether the deposit is in person or by mail is held to make
no differeice except that the latter type of deposit gives rise to the
further controversy as to whether payment is complete upon mailing the
notification or only upon the receipt thereof-a controversy which,
23
despite its intriguing nature, need not be explored in this discussion.
One of the predominant reasons advanced for the majority rule
is that the condition of the drawer's account rests within the knowledge
of the drawee bank, and that if the bank has any misgivings on the
subject, it should examine the account before delivering the passbook
or deposit slip to the depositor. This view finds support in the following
24
remarks of the court in Oddie v. National City Bank:
Gruber v. Bank of America, 127 Misc. 132, 215 N.Y. Supp. 222 (City Ct. 1926) ; Provident Say. Bank & Trust Co. v. Hildebrand, 49 Ohio App. 207, 196 N.E. 790 (1934);
accord, National Bank v. Burkhardt, 100 U.S. 686 (1879); State ex rel. Las Vegas v.
Sandoval, 34 N.M. 50, 277 Pac. 31 (1929) (bank failure); Norton v. Mercantile Bank
& Trust Co., 51 S.W.2d 1062 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932) (drawer's insolvency); see
Federal Say. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Third Nat. Bank, 173 F.2d 192, 199 (6th Cir. 1949);
Snyder v. Hamilton Nat. Bank, 65 Colo. 24, 30, 172 Pac. 1069, 1071, 1072 (1918);
BRADY, BANK CHECKS

§ 260 (2d ed. 1926); 2 MORSE,

BANKS AND BANKING

1216 (6th

ed. 1928); Note, 50 COL. L. REv. 802, 818 (1950); 6 U. OF CiN. L. REV. 238 (1932);
80 U. OF PA. L. REv. 740 (1932); Note, 15 A.L.R. 709 (1921). In some of
the cases the bank's attempted revocation did not take place until after the day of deposit.
yet the ratio decidendi was broad enough to include revocations attempted on the day of
deposit. American Nat. Bank v. Miller, Agent, 229 U.S. 517 (1913) ; Cohen v. First Nat.
Bank, 22 Ariz. 394, 198 Pac. 122 (1921) (where, however, the court noted the possible
distinction) ; American Exchange Nat. Bank v. Gregg, 138 Ill. 596, 28 N.E. 839 (1891) ;
Bryan v. First Nat. Bank, 205 Pa. 7, 54 Atl. 480 (1903). Oddie v. National City Bank, 45
N.Y. 735 (1871), cited as a leading authority for the majority view, contains
some factual variations which might justify the conclusion that it is not precisely, in
point. See the comments on the Oddie case in National Gold Bank & Trust Co. v.
McDonald, 51 Cal. 64 (1875). Since the check is paid by the entering of credit in the
passbook, a subsequent stop payment order is ineffective, even though it arrives before
the drawer's account has been debited. 24 MINN. L. REv. 982 (1940).
22. This concept of the credit transaction is to be found in many authorities. E. g.,
National Bank v. Burkhardt, 100 U.S. 686, 689 (1879); American Nat. Bank v. Miller,
229 U.S. 517, 520 (1913); Federal Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Third Nat. Bank, 173
F.2d 192, 199 (6th Cir. 1949) ; First Nat. Bank v. McKeen, 197 Ark. 1060, 1062, 127
S.W.2d 142, -143 (1939) ; National Deposit Bank v. Ohio Oil Co., 250 Ky. 288, 291, 62
S.W.2d 1048, 1050 (1933); Oddie v. National City Bank, 45 N.Y. 735, 741 (1871);
Gruber v. Bank of America, 127 Misc. 132, 134, 215 N.Y. Supp. 222, 224 (City Ct.
1926) ; Hunt v. Security State Bank, 91 Ore. 362, 369, 179 Pac. 248, 251 (1919) ; Bryan
v. First Nat. Bank, 205 Pa. 7, 11, 54 Atd. 480, 482 (1903); Boatright v. Rankin, 150
S.C. 374, 380, 148 S.E. 214, 216 (1929); Norton v. Mercantile Bank & Trust Co., 51
S.W.2d 1062, 1063 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932)-l; 2 MORSE, BANKS AND BANKING 1217 (6th
ed. 1928) ; Note, 15 A.L.R. 709, 710 (1921).
23. For a "starter," see Cohen v. First Nat. Bank, 22 Ariz. 394, 198 Pac. 122
(1921) (mailing is sufficient) ; Guardian Nat. Bank v. Huntington County State Bank,
206 Ind. 185, 187 N.E. 388 (1933) (mailing is not sufficient, since postal regulations
permit withdrawal from the mails) ; 47 HARV. L. REV. 871 (1934) ; 80 U. OF PA. L. REv.
740 (1932).
24. 45 N.Y. 735, 742 (1871).
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The bank always has the means of knowing the state of
the account of the drawer, and if it elects to pay the paper, it
voluntarily takes upon itself the risk of securing it out of the
drawer's account or otherwise.
No one will deny that theoretically the argument is sound. And in
the simpler days of past generations there was doubtless no element of
unfairness in adhering to the rule. In many parts of the country the
banking business had not reached the highly complex state existing
today. The banker and his clerks (if any) were well acquainted with
the depositors, and usually knew the condition of each one's account. If
perchance the latter piece of information was lacking, the banker or
his clerk could look it up in a moment, and there was seldom a line of
depositors who would be kept waiting during such an investigation.2 'r
As late as 1919, an Oregon case presents a picture of the simplicity of
small-town banking. When the morning mail arrived, the president of
the bank footed the checks on the adding machine to see that each total
corresponded with the cash letter, and examined them for signatures and
26
state of account.
How vastly removed are those halcyon days from the present highblood-pressure era when a bevy of tellers are kept busy handling long
lines of customers. Imagine the reaction of the impatient horde if an
examination must be made of all the checks presented to the teller by
each depositor, in order to ascertain the genuineness of every check and
the state of account of every drawer. The resulting delay would be
interminable and would probably cause a caterwauling audible blocks
away and even loud enough to permeate the sound-proof. sanctum of the
bank's president. How long would such a bank be able to retain its
customers? And what about the morale of the bookkeepers, trying manfully to get along with the job of posting debits and credits to the
various accounts, if their work is constantly interrupted by tellers inquiring about the genuineness of each check and the state of account
of each drawer?
No, the "majority" rule, which, after all, grew up in a more tranquil
age, does not conform to the complexities of modern banking. Today,
the teller must enter the credit immediately, either in the passbook or on
a duplicate deposit slip, and permit the customer to move on to make
way for the next person. To hold that such a credit constitutes payment
and is irrevocable places an undue burden upon the bank.
25. This picture of the past was obtained from several banking officials who have

worked in the business for forty years or more.
26. Hunt v. Security State Bank, 91 Ore. 362, 364, 179 Pac. 248, 249 (1919).
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More realistic and equitable are the California decisions, taking a
position exactly opposite to that of the majority. In National Gold
Bank and Trtst Company v. McDonald,27 the depositor presented his
check and passbook at 2 p.m. The teller received the check and entered
the proper credit in the passbook. At 3 p.m., the bank, having found ihe
drawer's account insufficient, returned the check %andnotified the depositor
that it was not good. In a suit by the depositor against the bank, the
trial court rendered judgment for the plaintiff upon the ground that the
item was presented and received as a cash deposit. The Supreme Court
reversed the judgment, holding that the finding was not supported by
the evidence and adopting the rule that under the facts enumerated, the
check was not received as cash, but merely for collection. Under this
theory the drawee takes the item as agent to collect from itself, and the
credit may be revoked exactly as in the case of an uncollected item drawn
on another bank. The acts are definitely held to fall short of payment..2 s
It should be noted that in the cases upholding the majority rule no
evidence was presented indicating or implying an agreement allowing the
bank to revoke the credit. If, on the other hand, the bank is able to
prove the existence of a custom permitting the revocation of a credit
upon discovery during the day that the check is not good, the depositor
should be bound by the custom, at least if he was familiar with it. Payment depends upon the intent of the parties. In the absence of contadictory evidence, they should be presumed to have dealt in accordance
with a custom known to both. 29 And there is authority for extending
27. 51 Cal. 64 (1875).
28. The rule was announced again some years later, the court also holding that
the situation was not altered by stamping the check "Paid", impaling it on the check
file, and crediting it to the depositor's ledger account. Ocean Park Bank v. Rogers, 6
Cal. App. 678, 92 Pac. 879 (1907). The California rule is approved in Stankey v.
Citizens' Nat. Bank, 64 Mont. 309, 209 Pac. 1054 (1922). The act of stamping_ the
check "Paid" seems not to be considered of any importance. Cohen v. First Nat. Bank,
22 Ariz. 394, 198 Pac. 122 (1921) (check not stamped; court held payment); Guardian
Nat. Bank v. Huntington County State Bank, 206 Ind. 185, 187 N.E. 388 (1933)
(check not stamped; held no payment, but decision reached on other grounds) ; Ocean
Park Bank v. Rogers, 6 Cal. App. 678, 92 Pac. 879 (1907) (check stamped; held not
paid). In the following cases the court, in holding that the check was paid, gave no
consideration to the fact that it had been stamped "Paid": American Exchange Nat.
Bank v." Gregg, 138 Ill. 596, 28 N.E. 839 (1891) ; Consolidated Nat. Bank v. First Nat.
Bank, 129 App. Div. 538, 114 N.Y. Supp. 308 (1908), aff'd without opinion, 199 N.Y.
516, 92 N.E. 1081 (1910); Bryan v. First Nat. Bank, 205 Pa. 7, 54 Atl. 480 (1903).
Since the stamping or cancellation of the check is merely part of the clerical routine
of the bank, and may take place before the drawer's account has been examined, the
courts are correct in attaching no significance to it. However, I am informed .by bank
officials that at present the, cancelling of the checks (they are run through a perforating
machine) is customarily the last act of the routine, and does not occur until after the
examination of the drawer's account.
29. First Nat. Bank v. Ihle, 202 Ark. 46, 149 g.W.2d 548 (1941) ; First Nat. Bank
v. McKeen, 197 Ark. 1060, 127 S.W.2d 142 (1939) (holding evidence insufficient to
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this proposition to include the case of a depositor who has no knowledge
of the custom, provided he ought to have known of it.30 Such an extension of the doctrine seems eminently fair. A person dealing with
banks should be subject to all reasonable banking usages. 3 1 No hardship
results to the depositor, for in reality, most depositors never heard of
the rules of law concerning payment by credit, and do not make deposits
with any such issue in mind. 32 Any -depositor aware of the problem can
very easily evidence his intent by express agreement or other form of
manifestation.
At the present time banks customarily resort to recitals on signature
cards, passbooks, and deposit slips to regulate the legal relationship
between themselves and their customers in the collection of checks. Assuming for the moment that such recitals constitute a contract and therefore are binding upon the depositor, it becomes necessary for the court
to interpret them. Inasmuch as the more pressing problems have arisen
out of the collection of checks drawn on banks other than the depository
bank, many of the recitals are so worded as apparently to apply only to
such checks. Thus, for example, in an Illinois case, the deposit slip
provided:

"All items received . . . for deposit are credited subject to

final payment, reserving the right to charge back any items not paid."
The court held that this clause referred only to checks drawn on other
banks, and could not logically be interpreted to include checks drawn on
the bank of deposit.33
A Louisiana court reached the same conclusion in a case wherein the
back of the deposit slip contained the following paragraph:
All items credited subject to final payment. All items not
payable in Haynesville received by this bank for credit or collection are taken at the owner's risk.
prove a custom known to depositor) ; Pollack v. National Bank of Commerce, 168 Mo.
App. 368, 151 S.W. 774 (1912) (estoppel to deny intention to be bound by a known
custom); BRADY, BANK CHECKS " 260 (2d ed. 1926).
30. Townley v. Exchange Nat Bank, 108 Okla. 144, 234 Pac. 574 (1925). But cf.
National Bank v. Burkhardt, 100 U.S. 686 (1879).
31. See Andrews, The City Clearing House: Problems Concernig Nonanembers,
2 WESTERN RES. L. RE. 109, 110 (1950).
32. Of course it may be argued that when the depositor hands in his checks and
receives credit in his passbook, his understanding of the transaction is that the amount

credited has become part of his account, for which reason the credit should be irrevocable in the absence of knowledge of the contrary custom.
33. Hay and Stephens v.
restricted interpretation of a
collection, the bank acts only
214 Iowa 1199, 243 N.W. 542

First Nat. Bank, 244 Ill. App. 286 (1927). For a very
clause providing that in receiving items for deposit or
as agent, see Andrew v. Security Trust &' Say. Bank,
(1932) (a five to four decision).
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There followed a provision concerning the responsibility assumed by
the bank in forwarding items to collecting agents outside of Haynes34
Ville.
On the other hand, the deposit slip or other pertinent document may
specifically include checks drawn on the bank of deposit, in'which event
the courts cannot logically make an interpretation to the contrary.3 5
Indeed, at the present time the standard collection agreement, issued by
the American Bankers Association, contains such a provision, 6 and the
great majority of banks are probably making use of it and thereby
37
avoiding difficulties of interpretation arising from "foggy" language.
Whether recitals on signature cards, passbooks, or deposit slips
constitute a contract is a perplexing problem, the definite solution of
which, if any there be, lies outside the scope of this discussion. Apparently the mere presence of the recital does not suffice. In some way it
must be brought to the attention of the depositor, although he need not
actually have read it.3

Naturally, if a contract has been created, the

depositor is bound by its terms.
The most satisfactory manner of solving the problem of revoking
credits is by statute, and Section 3 of the Bank Collection Code puts
an end to the controversy in the states of its adoption. The section reads:
34. Schutte v. Citizens Bank, 3 La. App. 547, 551 (1926).
35. First Nat. Bank v. Ihle, 202 Ark. 46, 149 S.W.2d 548 (1941) ; Citizens State
Bank v. Pritchett, 231 P.2d 462 (Colo. 1951) ; Lebanon Bank & Trust Co. v. Grandstaff,
24 Tenn. App. 162, 141 S.W.2d 924, cert. denied (1940).

36. Note, 50 COL. L. REV. 802, 818 n. 115 (1950).

37. In a Minnesota case the agreement permitted the bank to charge back any item
drawn on it and later found to be not good. Plaintiff made a deposit, the amount of
which was credited to him in his passbook. Thereafter, a stop payment order arrived
at the bank. The court, held that under the agreement the bank had no right to charge
back the amount of the check, inasmuch as it did not fall within the term "not good."
The check was perfectly good, decided the court, and the stop payment order did not
make it a "not good" check. W. A. White Brokerage Co. v. Cooperman, 207 Minn. 239,
290 N.W. 790 (1940).
38. E. S. Macomber & Co. v. Commercial Bank, 166 S.C. 236, 164 S.E. 596 (1932)
(using the same form of deposit slip for over a year held sufficient) ; Hardee v. George
H. Price Co., 89 F.2d 497 (D.C. Cir. 1937) (deliberately .choosing a particular form of
deposit slip) ; see BRADY, BANK CHEcKS § 267 et seq. (2d ed. 1926). In Lebanon Bank
& Trust Co. v. Grandstaff, 24 Tenn. App. 162, 141 S.W.2d 924, cert. denied (1940), the
court indicated that the mere use of the deposit slip was sufficient, but probably did
not intend to go that far, for it cited in support of its opinion the Macomber and
Hardee cases, supra this note, neither of which adopted such an extreme position.
However, an Arkansas case appears to go all the way. First Nat. Bank v. Ihle, 202
Ark. 46, 149 S.W.2d 548 (194,1). And in a recent Colorado case the court holds without debate that the provisions on the signature card, signed by the depositor at the time
of the opening of his account, constitute a contract. Citizens State Bank v. Pritchett,
231 P.2d 462 (Colo. 1951). At the other extreme is First Nat. Bank v. Hancock, 60
S.W.2d 871 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933), containing language to the effect that a deposit
slip is not a contract and that a depositor is not subject to its terms unless he expressly
ratifies them.
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A credit given by a bank for an item drawn on or payable
at such bank shall be provisional, subject to revocation at or
before the end of the day on which the item is deposited in the
event the item is found not payable for any reason. Whenever
a credit is given for an item deposited after banking hours
such right of revocation may be exercised during the following
business day.39
The statute is in line with the California cases and effectuates a
40
result conformable to modern business practice.
In states which held that an entry on a deposit slip or in a passbook
did not amount to final payment, and in states where the issue had never
been litigated, the question sometimes arose as to what other acts or
combination of acts were sufficient to constitute final payment, precluding a cancellation of the credit.
In the days of comparatively simple bookkeeping, the banker kept
a journal in which he entered each item of the day's business. These
entries were eventually "posted" in the general ledger. Today, banks
do not keep such daily journals, and the entries are made directly in the
general ledger. However, many banks keep a "check journal," on which
the amount of each check received is listed and the total arrived at; and
a "general cash sheet," for the purpose of showing the bank;s cash condition. It seems clear that entries on these documents, in no way intended
as a record of the individual accounts of the depositors, should not be
considered as payment. 41
Nothing else appearing, the combination of crediting the depositor's
account and debiting the drawer's account has been held to constitute
final transfer of the credit from the drawer to the depositor, and therefore to amount to payment. 42 Under this view, the transaction is irre39. For a case where the court held that the statutory language (not the Bank
Collection Code) was not intended to cover deposits in the drawee bank, see W. A.
White Brokerage Co. v. Cooperman, 207 Minn. 239, 290 N.W. 790 (1940).
40. See Wallace, Comments on the Proposed Uniform Check Collection Code, 16

VA. L. Rv.792, 804, 805 (1930).

41. A good description of the routine will be found in Guardian Nat. Bank v.
Huntington County State Bank, 206 Ind. 185, 187 N.E. 388 (1933). In a case involving a check presented through the clearing house, in which, however, the clearing
house rule was held not to apply, the drawee bank made out a slip showing the aggregate amount of the checks cleared against each drawer. Before. examination of the.
checks, the slip was sent to the bookkeeper, who at once made a "tentative" entry in
red ink in the debit column of the "balance ledger account." The court held that no
payment had occurred. First Nat. Bank v. National Park Bank, 181 App. Div. 103, 168
N.Y. Supp. 422 (1st Dep't 1917).
42. Hay and Stevens v. First Nat. Bank, 244 111.
App. 286 (1927); Consolidated
Nat. Bank v. First Nat. Bank, 129 App. Div. 538, 114 N.Y. Supp. 308 (2d Dep't 1908),
aff'd without opinion, 199 N.Y. 516, 92 N.E. 1081 (1910); see 30 MIcH. L. REv. 962
(1932). The Consolidated Nat. Bank case concerned a deposit by mail, and ap-
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vocable and the book entries cannot be reversed even though the bookkeeper later finds that he has made a mistake in the amount on deposit
in the drawer's account, or that some of the checks credited to the account
have "bounced," or that the drawer's signature was forged, or that the
drawer has become insolvent. Likewise, a stop payment order or an
43
order of attachment comes too late to be effective.
Section 3 of the Bank Collection Code does not state expressly the
effect of debiting the drawer's account. But, as noted, the section permits the bank to revoke the credit during the day of deposit "in the
event the item is found not payable for any reason." Since nothing is
said about debiting the drawer's account, presumably it is regarded as a
matter of no significance and will not preclude the revocation of the
credit.4"
Turning now to the clearing house cases, it is apparent that an act
falling short of payment in a non-clearing house case will not operate as
payment in a clearing house case. Thus, for example, the mere fact that
the check was stamped "paid" will not prevent cancellation of the "pay45
ment" and return of the item.

It has been pointed out that many of the payment cases involving
direct presentment deal with a deposit by the customer, a credit entered
in his passbook, or on a deposit slip, and a subsequent attempt by the
bank to revoke the credit. The clearing house cases do not raise the
exact issue presented by those bare facts. That is because, as already
noted, it is definitely established that the credits entered at the clearing
house are intended to be provisional only and do not amount to payment.
And no other individual credits are made in favor of any particular
46
,presenting bank.
parently no notice of credit had been mailed to the depositor. Should the mailing of
such a notice be essential to constitute payment? Of course, as before noted, under the
majority rule the debiting of the drawer's account is unnecessary. Crediting the payee's
passbook suffices.
43. Albers v. Commercial Bank, 9 Mo. App. 59 (1880) (stop payment order).
Although a clearing house was involved, the case should be classified with the nonclearing house material, because the "return" custom did not embrace checks upon which
payment had been stopped.
44. Section 7 of the Bank Collection Code, dealing with deposits received by mail,
states that where the item is received 'by mail by a solvent drawee bank, it shall be
demed paid when the amount is finally charged to the account of the maker or drawer.
45. Grosner v. First Nat. Bank, 5 F. Supp. 468 (E.D. Mich. 1933) (clearing house
stamp); Akron Scrap Iron Co. v. Guardian Say. & Trust Co., 120 Ohio St. 120, 165
N.E. 715 (1929) (drawee's stamp); Hall v. First Nat. Bank, 252 S.W. 828 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1923), modified, 254 S.W. 522 (1923) (clearing house stamp; modification on
another point); Fernandey v. Glynn, 1 Camp. 426 n., 170 Eng. Rep. 1009 n. (1807)
(drawee's stamp).
46. In a city which settles clearing house balances by entries on the books of the
local federal reserve bank, a drawee bank showing a debit balance for the day's
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Consequently, the only problem causing any difficulty arises when
the drawee bank debits the drawer's account, and later wishes to cancel
the entry, treat the check as dishonored, and return it to the presenting
bank within the time stipulated by the clearing house rule. In debiting
the drawer's account, the bank has performed an act which ordinarily is
considered payment. But the banks, by rule, have agreed that items may
be returned before a certain hour. Since payment is a matter of intent,
and the parties have set down their intent in the rules of the clearing
house, the solution of the problem becomes merely a matter of interpretation of the rule. In this respect the situation is similar to that involving
printed recitals in passbooks and deposit slips, agreed to by the depositor.
An examination of a number of clearing house rules reveals that
the terms in most general use are "not good" items, "not paid" items,
"dishonored" items, and "unpaid" items. 4 7 For the return of such items
48
It
by a certain time, the typical clearing house rule makes provision.
follows that the term "not good" items, or whichever other, appellation
the clearing house in question may employ, must be interpreted.
It may conceivably be argued that a "not good" or "not paid" item
means only an item which never has been charged against the drawer's
account, by reason of the discovery of a shortage of funds, forgery, or
the like. The argument gains in plausibility when it is recalled that
checks are inspected for irregularities, omissions, forgeries, and other
defects before being entered in the general ledger, and thaf the bookkeeper examines the state of the drawer's account before making his
entry. As a consequence, the item might be regarded as "good" or
"paid" when, after successfully completing the several tests, it is finally
charged against the drawer. Yet this interpretation seems to overlook
the fundamental purpose of the rule, which is to permit the banks to
wait until a certain time before finally deciding whether to honor or
dishonor the items presented. Had the banks wished to make the debiting
of the drawer's account the last "Ate," they could easily have said so in
clearings credits the amount thereof in its general ledger to the reserve bank. This

does not amount to payment of any particular check, for the clearing house balances are
arrived at solely on the basis of the provisional debits and credits made at the clearing.

47. In addition, many clearing houses include missent items, irregular items, and
others. For further information about methods of dealing with return items, see
Andrews, The Operation of the City Clearing House, 51 YALE L.J. 582, 598 (1942).
48. The Buffalo rule reads as follows: "Dishonored Items. All checks . . . or
other items presented for payment through the Clearing House which are rejected
shall be returned through the regular morning exchanges of the next succeeding business
day."
The Detroit rule provides: "Unpaid items may be returned in any Exchange not
later than the 2:00 P. M. Returned Item Exchange of the following business day. . .
These are given as examples. Many of the rules are much more detailed.
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their rule. In the absence of a provision to that effect, the rule should
be interpreted to mean that the check is not paid until the expiration of
the return period. 40
The banks themselves' place this interpretation upon the terms
used . 0 And it is familiar law that parol evidence is admissible to explain
the meaning of terms peculiar to the trade or business in which the
contracting parties are engaged. Consequeritly, if the banks interpret
the phrase "not paid" as permitting the return of an item even after the
drawer's account has been charged, such an interpretation should be
determinative.
The practical importance of the question is best illustrated by an
enumeration of several possibilities which may occur after the bookkeeper has debited the drawer's account.
(1) The bank receives word that the drawer's signature is forged.
(2) The bank finds that since the debiting of the account, checks
have been cashed over the counter to an amount sufficient to make the
check in question an overdraft.
(3) The bank finds that some of the items standing to the drawer's
credit have been returned "not good," as a result of which the check has
become an overdraft.
(4) The bookkeeper finds that he has made a mistake in the amount
on deposit, as a consequence of which the check is an overdraft.
(5) The bank learns that the drawer, who owes the bank on a
note, has become insolvent.
(6) A stop payment order arrives.
(7) An order of attachment arrives.
(8) An irregularity in the check is discovered, as, for instance,
that it is postdated."'
Under all these conditions, and others like them, banks permit the
52
return of the item as not paid or not good.
The reported cases dealing with the matter under consideration are
few and, for the most part, unsatisfactory. Doubtless the paucity of
autnorities bespeaks the practical effectiveness of the clearing house rule
49. Furthermore, it would be impracticable-in

fact, impossible-to wait until

he expiration of the "return" time before allowing the bookkeepers to commence their

task of making the entries. For this reason, also, the debiting of the drawer's account
should not be considered final payment.
50. A number of bank officials supplied this information.
51. Under a clearing house rule specifically including "irregular" items, the debiting
of the drawer's account should have no effect at all in the case of such an item. It is
as irregular after the debit entry as before.
52. For a criticism of the solution of diverse problems by one "payment" concept,
see Leary, Deferred Posting and Delayed Returns-The Current Check Collection
Problem, 62 HARv. L. REv. 905, 946-952 (1949).
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in action. In several instances the court reaches its conclusion without
reference to the clearing house rule, holding, for one reason or another,
that the rules of the association do not apply under the particular circumstances. 53 There are dicta to the effect that no payment. occurs until
the expiration of the time allowed for the return.5 4 But the only case
found which may be called directly in point is German National Bank v.
Farmers'Deposit National Bank.55 Even there, the only acts performed
by the drawee bank consisted of placing the check on a file and entering
it in a journal-acts which would not be considered payment anyhow.
However, the decision was placed squarely upon the ground that whether
or not the acts would have constituted payment in an over-the-counter
transaction, the clearing house rule prevented their amounting to payment until the expiration of the return period.
An Ohio case hits close to the mark, but the basis of the decision
is not entirely clear. 56 The only act of the bank was stamping the check
"Paid." As previously noted, this does not amount to payment and the
court so decided. But the court held also that evidence of the rules and
customs of the clearing house relating to returns should have been admitted. In view of that ruling, one might argue that the court intended
to base its decision on two points; namely, that the stamping was not
payment, and that in any event no payment took place until the time
limit had expired. If the court did not so intend, it is difficult to understand the relevancy of the clearing house rules and they should not have
57
been admitted in evidence.
Another case cited on the point proves a great disappointment when
the facts are analyzed. 58 After the bookkeepers had charged the check
53. There is no need to cite these decisions here. They have been included, where
applicable, among the non-clearing house authorities.
54. Eastman Kodak Co. v. National Park Bank, 231 Fed. 320, 324 (S.D. N.Y.
1916), aff'd without opinion, 247 Fed. 1002 (2d Cir. 1917) ; Security-First Nat. Bank v.
Bank of America Nat. Trust & Sav. Ass'n, 22 Cal.2d 154, 161, 137 P.2d 452, 456 (1943) ;
Campbell v. Love, 168 Miss. 75, 84, 150 So. 780, 782 (1933); Hentz v. National City
Bank, 159 App. Div. 743, 746, 144 N.Y. Supp. 979, 981 (1st Dep't 1913). (In these
cases the facts did not show that the drawee had made any entries.) But see United
States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. First Nat. Bank, 129 Neb. 102, 109, 260 N.W. 798, 801
(1935). In support of its dictum the court cited First Nat. Bank v. National Park
Bank, 100 Misc. 31, 165 N.Y. Supp. 15 (Sup. Ct. 1917), which, apparently unbeknown to
the court, was reversed in 181 App. Div. 103, 168 N.Y. Supp. 422 (1st Dep't 1917),
and in which the debit entry was only "tentative."
55. 118 Pa. 294, 12 Atl. 303 (1888).
56. Akron Scrap Iron Co. v. Guardian Sav. & Trust Co., 120 Ohio St. 120, 165

N.E. 715 (1929).
57. It is interesting to note that plaintiff's petition alleged that the bank debited
the drawer's account. Defendant's denial made this an issue, but we hear nothing more
about it in the opinion. Presumably, the plaintiff offered no proof on the subject.
58. Liberty Nat. Bank v. Vanderslice-Lynds Co., 388 Mo. 932, 95 ,S.W.2d 324

(1936).
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to the drawer's account, they were informed of a stop payment order. In
holding that the check had not been paid, the court gave every indication
of being in line with the correct rule. However, a careful investigation
of the facts reveals that the stop payment order apparently reached the
bank before the checks had arrived from the clearing house. Consequently, its arrival was in ample time. And the court stated merely that
the order was received by the drawee in time to be effective. Was it
effective because it arrived before the debiting of the account, or because
the period for returning dishonored items had not passed ?9
Despite the fact that dictum predominates over decision, and that
in some instances the decisions are not clear-cut, it seems correct to conclude that payment does not take place until the expiration of the time
allowed for returning items, and that this is true despite the performance
by the bank of acts which would constitute payment in an over-thecounter transaction.6"
In states which have adopted the Bank Collection Code the question
of the applicability of Section 3 to clearing house transactions is presented.
As previously stated, Section 3 provides that a credit given by a bank
for an item drawn on the same bank shall be provisional and subject
to revocation at or before the end of the day of deposit. As remarked by
Mr. Wallace, "In one sense of the word the tentative settlement in the
clearing house is a credit'given by the bank for the check." 61 However,
Section 3 was not conceived for the purpose of meeting any problem connected with the clearing house. Its purpose was to overthrow the
majority rule established for over-the-counter transactions, which unjustifiably prohibited the bank from revoking a credit once given. The
clearing house assaciations had already taken care of the problem by the
adoption of the rule relatingoto returns. Furthermore, even if the
language of the section is broad enough to cover clearing houses, there
is nothing to forbid their making their own agreement with reference to
returning items, and that agreement would prevail despite the statute, if
not in conflict with it.
59. The case is further complicated by the fact that the plaintiff bank did not
claim that the check was paid; instead, the claim was advanced b4 the defendant
drawer, who had ordered payment stopped.

60. But see Wallace, Comments on the Proposed Uniform Check Collection Code,
16 VA. L. REv. 792, 805 (1930). Mr. Wallace states that the cases are in disagreement
as to whether a check charged to the drawer's account thereby becomes paid so as to
prevent its return during the period stipulated by the clearing house rule. He cites two
cases, neither of which is in point.
61. Id. at 804. For the applicability of clearing house rules to nonmembers, see
Andrews, The City Clearing House: Problems-Concerning Nonntenber-s, 2
RES. L. REV. 109 (1950).

WESTMN

THE CITY CLEARING HOUSE

.171

Although the termination of the period prescribed by the clearing
house for the return of items may be said in general to operate as payment, a complication arises from the fact that banks sometimes accept
late returns and refund the amount to the drawee. Indeed, the practice
appears to be common, although ordinarily limited to items returned on
the specified day but after the specified hour. Certainly there is no reason
for the law to deny banks this right as among themselves. If a customer
wishes to allow his bank to revoke a credit entered in his passbook, the
courts should not forbid his doing so. And the acceptance of a late return
62
'by the presenting bank is analogous.
As might be expected, there are few decisions upon the subject. All
of them recognize the right. A brief statement of the facts in each
case will throw light on the proposition, by indicating how the question
has arisen.
In Stuyvesant Bank v. National Mechanics' Banking Association"3
plaintiff bank was not a member of the clearing house, but cleared
through the M bank, its clearing agent. Plaintiff bank sent some checks
to the M bank, which presented them through the clearing house. The
checks were paid. A few days later the drawee discovered that they
were forged. Contrary to clearing house rules, the drawee sent them
back through the clearing house. M bank allowed them to go through,
charged the amount back against plaintiff, and returned the checks to
plaintiff. Plaintiff obtained an assignment from the M bank of its
alleged claim against the drawee, and sued the drawee for the amount
of the items. In an opinion not distinguished for its lucidity, the court
correctly held in favor of the defendant, remarking that it was competent
for the M bank to waive the delay in returning the paper.
Corn Exchange Bank v. Fifth National Bank 4 presents the issue
in a slightly different setting. After the "zero" hbur for returning
checks, the drawee told the presenting bank that the drawer's account
did not contain sufficient funds. The presenting bank accepted the return
and reimbursed the drawee. Thereafter, the latter discovered that the
drawer's signature had been forged. This information the draweepassed
along to the presenting bank. A few days later the presenting bank,
hoping perhaps to catch the drawee napping, put the check through
again. This time the drawee returned the check in accordance with the
rule, but the presenting bank refused to accept the return or refund the
amount, stating that had it known of the forgery, it would never have
62. See supra note 61 With reference to nonmembers.
63. 7 Lans. 197 (N.Y. 1872).
64. 123 Misc. 328, 205 N.Y. Supp. 777 (N.Y. City Ct. 1924).
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acdepted the return the first time. The drawee thereupon sued the presenting bank and recovered, the court pointing out that the presenting
bank was competent to waive the rule requiring returns to be made by
a certain time, and had done so unconditionally in this instance.
The most interesting application of the right to waive is to be
found in In re Smith, Lockhart and Co. 6 5 The presenting banks accepted

several items returned late, and made the usual refund to the drawee.
Shortly before the returns, a bankruptcy petition had been filed against
the drawer. This, however, the drawee did not know. Some days later
the drawee, knowing of the bankruptcy proceedings and the appointment
of a receiver for the drawer, repaid the amount to the presenting banks,
upon the theory that the drawee had not been entitled to the refunds.
The drawer's trustee in bankruptcy sued the drawee for the amount of
the deposit represented by the returned checks. The trustee contended
that the bank's payment, made with knowledge of the bankruptcy proceedings and the appointment of a receiver, was wrongful. The drawee
countered with the argument that it had no legal right to the refunds,
and therefore was obliged to reimburse the presenting banks. The court
decided that the presenting banks had acted within their rights in accepting the late returns and reimbursing the drawee, as a consequence of
which the drawee was not obligated to pay back the amount to the
presenting banks. Since it was not so obligated, the payment, made with
knowledge of the receivership, was wrongful. 66
Other problems occasionally arise after the expiration of the time
limit for returning "not good" checks. Some of them are easy to solve
insofar as the clearing house aspect is concerned. The simplest involves
forged indorsements. Entirely apart from any clearing house aspect,
the courts permit recovery by the paying bank from the person who has
received payment of a check upon which an indorsement in the chain of
title has been forged.0 7 By reason of the forged indorsement, unknown
to either party, payment has taken place under a mistake of fact-a
familiar ground for allowing recovery. It has also been suggested that
recovery is based upon a guarantee by the person presenting the item for
65. 4 F.2d 444 (D. iNId. 1924).
66. The model deferred posting statute, which will be considered later, provides
for variation of its "effect" by agreement. Does that permit waiver of the statutory
deadline?
67. BRADY, BANK CHECKS § 165 et seq. (2d ed. 1926); BRITTON, BILLS AND
NOTES

641-650 (1943); 2 MORSE, BANKS AND BANKING § 476 (6th ed. 1928); WooDCONTRACTS, § 80 et seq. (1913); Note, 50 CoL. L. REV. 802, 823 (1950).

WARD, QUASI

This paper is not concerned with exceptions to and modifications of the rule. Apparently
standing alone is a case wherein the court allowed the drawee bank to recover one-half
the amount of the check. Capital City Bank v. Lewis State Bank, 143 Fla. 768, 197 So.
528 (1940), 7 U. of PITT. L. REv. 136 (1941).
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payment that all prior indorsements are genuine.Gs But the Negotiable
Instruments Law gives no justification for this latter line of reasoning.
It is true that by Section 66 one who indorses without qualification warrants that he has good title to the instrument. 60 It is equally true that
one who takes through a forged indorsement does not have good title
to the instrument." However, Section 66 specifies that the warranties
enumerated run "to all subsequent holders in due course", and by no
stretch of the imagination can the drawee, in receiving and paying the
check, be included in the favored category. Likewise, Section 65 applies
only to persons "negotiating" the instrument, and a presentation to the
drawee for payment is not a negotiation. 71
Since the principle of recovery of money paid under mistake of
fact assumes that the money has been actually paid, it is manifest that
recovery may be had in clearing house as well as non-clearing house
cases. When the time for returning an item has expired, the item is
treated as paid, and the parties stand in the same position as though
payment had been made across the counter. The return time rule was
not intended to interfere with well-recognized principles of law relating
to recovery of money already paid. Indeed, the proposition is so obvious
that in the clearing house cases the courts, in upholding the right to
recover, make no mention of the return time rule.72
In clearing house transactions recovery may be based also upon an
express guarantee by the forwarding bank to the drawee bank of the
genuineness of prior indorsements. It is customary for clearing house
associations to provide for an indorsement stamp to be affixed upon each
item by the presenting bank. The regulations of a number of associations
-probably the majority-require that the words "Prior endorsements
guaranteed" shall be an integral part of the stamp. Some associations,
while not including those words in the prescribed stamp, stipulate that
the stamped indorsement of itself shall constitute a guarantee of all prior
indorsements. Others, in an excess of caution, do both.
68. E. g., Insurance Company of North America v. Fourth Nat. Bank, 12 F.2d
100 (N.D. Ga. 1926).
69. The same warranty is created by a qualified indorsement. NEGOTIABLE INSTRU-

MENTs LAW

§ 65.

70. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW

71.

BRITTON,

BILLS

AND

§ 23.

NOTES 644 (1943); 6

INTRAMURAL

L. REV. OF NEW

YORK UNIVERSITY 198, 199 (1951). By §4 of the Bank Collection Code, adopted in
some states, the restrictive indorser guarantees to the drawee the genuineness of prior
indorsements.
72. Merchants Nat. Bank v. Continental Nat. Bank, 98 Cal. App. 523, 277 Pac.
354 (1929); Union Tool Co. v. Farmers and Merchants Nat. Bank, 192 Cal. 40, 218
Pac. 424 (1923) ; State v. Merchants Nat. Bank, 145 Minn. 322, 177 N.W. 135 (1920).
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If, by either the stamp or. the regulation, prior indorsements are
guaranteed, it is clear that the guarantee will enable the drawee to
recover the amount paid. 73 The situation is not like the one resulting
from Section 66 of the Negotiable Instruments Law, where, as already
noted, the guarantee goes only to a holder in due course. Since the items
sent through the clearing house are presented to the dfawee only, the
guarantee imposed upon the presenting bank must be intended to inure
to the benefit of the drawee-otherwise it would be without any force
at all.
A number of the associations specify that the guarantee shall not
supply the place of a missing indorsement. In Merchants NationalBank
v. ContinentalNational Bank,"4 defendant advanced the absurd argument
that a forged indorsement was a missing indorsement, and therefore,
not covered by the guarantee. Were such an argument to prevail, the
guarantee of prior indorsements wouldI be meaningless; and the court
made short work of the matter, holding that the provision relating to
missing indorsements referred not to invalid indorsements but to cases
where there was no indorsement at all.
The principle permitting recovery of money paid under mistake of
fact extends to paper which has been wrongfully altered, as, for instance,
by raising the amount payable. 75 As in the case of the forged indorsement, the clearing house regulatiois limiting the time for returning not
good items have no application to the recovery of money paid on altered
instruments, and courts permit recovery without mention of any such
regulations. 6
73. Union Tool Co. v. Farmers and' Merchants Nat. Bank, 192 Cal. 40, 218 Pac.
424 (1923); Merchants Nat. Bank v. Continental Nat. Bank, 98 Cal. App. 523, 277 Pac.
354 (1929); Hibernia Nat. Bank v. National Bank of Commerce, 204 La. 777, 16 So.2d
352 (1943). The rule that a drawee bank is liable to the drawer for paying on a
forged indorsement is not affected by the fact that the presenting bank's clearing house
ind(rsement stamp constituted a guarantee of prior indorsements. Jordan Marsh Co.
v. National Shawmut Bank, 201 Mass. 397, 87 N.E. 740 (1909).
74. 98 Cal. App. 523, 277 Pac. 354 (1929).
75. BRADY, BANK CHEcKS § 143 (2d ed. 1926); BlurroN, BILLS AND NOTES § 140
MORSE, BANKS AND BANKING §479 (6th ed. 1928); WOODWARD, QUASI

(1943); 2

§ 80 (1913) ; Note, 50 COL. L. REv. 802, 823 (1950). Under the Negotiable
Instruments Law there is conflict among the authorities. The problems are beyond the
scope of this article. For an argument against recovery even at common law, and a
suggested distinction from the forged indorsement case, see Ames, The Doctrine of
Price v. Neal, 4 HARV. L. REv. 297, 306 (1891).
76. Interstate Trust Co. v. United States Nat. Bank, 67 Colo. 6, 185 Pac. 260
(1919) (recovery based on theory of indorser's guarantee); Imperial Bank v. Bank
of Hamilton, [1903] A. C. 49. The right to recover is recognized also in Continental
Nat. Bank v. Tradesmen's Nat. Bank, 173 N.Y. 272, 65 N.E. 1108 (1903), where,
however, recovery was denied by reason of the drawee's negligence.
CONTRACTS
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Recovery was denied in an important California case, upon the
ground that the clearing house stamp, guaranteeing the validity of all
77
prior indorsements, did not amount to a guarantee against alteration.
It is clear, however, that in a situation and jurisdiction where the drawee
bank is allowed to recover an overpayment on an altered instrument, a
clearing house stamp guaranteeing prior indorsements should not preclude recovery. - The use of such a stamp in order to ensure recovery in
the case of a forged indorsement does not indicate an intention to deny
78
recovery in the case of an altered instrument.
The principle of recovery by reason of mistake of fact does not
extend to the forgery of the drawer's signature. 7 9 Without delving
deeply into the various theories behind this rule, it is enough to loint out
that the drawee bank is bound to know the signature of every depositor,
and guarantees the genuineness thereof. When the drawee bank sues
to recover money paid under d mistaken belief in the validity of the
drawer's signature, it encounters and bows to the judicially imposed
guarantee.
We have already seen that before the expiration of the clearing
house return time the drawee bank may send back a check upon which
the signature of the drawer has been forged. After the return- time has
passed, the check received through the clearing house stands upon the
same footing as any other check which the drawee has paid. It follows
that, by the weight of authority, the drawee, upon subsequently discovering the forgery, has no cause of action against the recipient for recovery
of the amount paid. 0
77. Crocker-Woolworth Nat. Bank v. Nevada Bank, 139 Cal. '564, 73 Pac. 456
(1903). The decision was based also upon other grounds.
78. See 20 BANKING L.J. 573 (1903).
79. BRADY, BANK CHECKS § 152 et seq. (2d ed. 1926) ; BRiTroN, BILLS AND NOTF
613-634 (1943); WOODWARD, QUASI CONTRACrS § 80 et seq. (1913); Ames, T1,
Doctrine of Price v. Neal, 4 HARV. L. REv. 297 (1891); 24 BANKING L. J. 947 (19071
Note, 50 COL. L. REv. 802, 822 (1950) ; 15 TULANE L. REV. 468 (1941). Here agai.-

since our concern is with the clearing house, there is no need to elaborate. Dean Ame,
favored the general rule upon the ground that courts should not interfere between persons having equal equities, but should let the loss lie where it has fallen.
80. Security Commercial & Say. Bank v. Southern Trust & Commerce Bank, 74
Cal. App. 734, 241 Pac. 945 (1925) (slightly weakened as a direct authority by various

factors discussed by the court) ; National Bank of Commerce v. Mechanics' American
Nat. Bank, 148 Mo. App. 1, 127 S.W. 429 (1910)

(in which, however, the court

erroneously used as an alternative ground of decision the fact that check was not
returned within clearing house time limit); United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v.
First Nat. Bank, 129 Neb. 102, 260 N.W. 798 (1935)

(also erroneously using late

return as alternative ground for decision); First Nat. Bank v. United States Nat.
Bank, 100 Ore. 264, 197 Pac. 547 (1921)

(included point that clearing house indorsement

stamp does not warrant genuineness of drawer's signature); Minnehaha Nat. Bank v.
Pence Pharmacy, 42 S.D. 525, 176 N.W. 37 (1920) (stating obvious truth that payment

through clearing house does not affect general rule).

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
Where, however, the recipient has not changed its position and
would suffer no loss if compelled to repay, there is authority granting
recovery."' As in the forged indorsement cases, the clearing house
8 2
return rule is entirely irrelevant.
Of course there is nothing sacrosanct about the principle involving
the drawee's guarantee of the genuineness of the drawer's signature, and
the legislature has a perfect right to scrap the rule and allow recovery if
it so desires. This it did in Pennsylvania, although the adoption of the
Negotiable Instruments Law has -long since repealed the earlier statute.
Under such a statute the drawee obtained reimbursement, and, as in other
situations previously discussed, the clearing house return time rule had
nothing to do with the proceeding.83
If the drawee makes payment under the mistaken belief that the
drawer's account is sufficient, recovery from the innocent purchaser for
value is generally denied.8 4 And there are clearing house cases in accord.8 5
The argument for the defendant is even more persuasive than in the
forged instrument situation, for whereas the forger may have performed
his task so deceptively as to confound the most meticulous employee, the
amount of the drawer's balance is ordinarily ascertainable by the employees of the bank.
Reverting to the situation in which the clearing house return time
rule applies and in which the deadline for the return of items must be
81. Only the cases involving payment through the clearing house are given. First
State Bank & Trust Co. v. First Nat. Bank, 314 Ill. 269, 145 N.E. 382 (1924) (not
mentioning clearing house return rule, thus implying that it was irrelevant) ; National
Bank of Baltimore v. Drovers and Mechanics Nat. Bank, 143 Md. 168, 122 Atl. 12
(1923) (forged certification, but principle same as forged drawer's signature; decision
based somewhat on interpretation of clearing house rule); Metropolitan Trust Co. v.
Federal Trust Co., 232 Mass. 363, 122 N.E. 413 (1919) (court pointed out that clearing
house rule was inapplicable and that situation was same as where check paid over
counter); National Bank of North America v. Bangs, 106 Mass. 441 (1871) (pointing
out same thing). This paper is not concerned with the intricacies of what constitutes
a loss or change of position-a question not peculiar to the clearing house.
82. See the parenthetical comments in the footnote next preceding.
83. Corn Exchange Nat. Bank v. National Bank of the Republic, 78 Pa. 233 (1875);
Tradesmen's Nat. Bank v. Third Nat. Bank, 66 Pa. 435 (1870).
84. BRADY, BANK CHECKS 418 (2d ed. 1926); BRrrToN, BILLS AND NOTES § 137
(1943) ; WOODWARD, QUASI CONTRACTS § 182 (1913) ; Ames, The Doctrine of Price v.
Neal, 4 HARV. L. REV. 297, 305 (1891). Payment by mistake in failing to observe a
stop payment order is analogous. E. g., Bank of Moulton v. Rankin, 24 Ala. App. 110,
131 So. 450 (1930); Miller v. Chatham & Phoenix Nat. Bank, 126 Misc. 559, 214 N.Y.
Supp. 76 (Sup.Ct. App. Term. 1926); Huffman v. Farmers' Nat. Bank, 10 S.W.2d 753
(Tex. Civ. App. 1928) ; BRITTON, BILLS AND NOTES 638 (1943). Contra: National Loan
& Exchange Bank v. Lachovitz, 131 S.C. 432, 128 S.E. 10 (1925).
85. Hallenbeck v. Leimert, 295 U.S. 116 (1935); Preston v. Canadian Bank of
Commerce, 23 Fed. 179 (N.D. Ill. 1883). Nothing appears in either case indicating
whether or not the defendant had changed his position. Evidently the court considered
it immaterial.
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met, it has been stated that in Massachusetts and New York the drawee
bank may recover even though the check is not returned within the
clearing house time limit, provided the defendant has suffered no loss
by reason of the delay. 6 But a study of the cases reveals that the statement is not entirely accurate. In fact, in Boylston National Bank v.
Richardson,8 7 wherein the teller did not investigate the drawer's account
until after the time stipulated by the clearing house rule for the return
of not good items, the court denied recovery despite the fact that apparently the defendant had not changed its position. s If change of position
is the sole test in Massachusetts, the plaintiff should have won. The
court efiphasized the point that the transaction did not give rise to any
mistake of fact in the legal sense, but merely showed laches on the
teller's part in failing to examine the account.8 9 Examination of the
Boylston case and the other Massachusetts authorities discloses that the
plaintiff is not entitled to recover unless the delay in returning the item
occurred because of some mistake of fact. 90
Merchants' National Bank v. NationalBank ofthe Commonwealth0 1
exemplifies the meaning of mistake of fact under the Massachusetts doctrine. The plaintiff bank held a quantity of sugar as security for a loan
made to B. B informed the president of the bank that he had contracted.
to sell some of the sugar. Thereupon the president delivered to B the
warehouse receipts for the sugar. It was agreed that the proceeds from
the sale should be applied against B's debt. B sold the sugar and deposited the proceeds in his account with the plaintiff bank. A few days
later B drew a check on the plaintiff bank, and it came through the clear86. See BRADY, BANK CHECKS 420 (2d ed. 1926). For a somewhat different
statement of the Massachusetts rule see 24 BANKING L. J. 91, 93 (1907).
87. 101 Mass. 287 (1869).
88. In the Boylstom case the defendant was not the presenting bank, but was the
prior holder of the check. However, this fact did not appear to be the determinative one.
89. Distinguished authorities have asserted that a negligent failure to discover the
truth will not bar recovery in mistake of fact cases. WOODWARD, QUASI CONTRACrS § 92
(1913) ; Ames, The Doctrine of Price v. Neal, 4 HA~v. L. REv. 297, 298 (1891). And
in Merchants Nat. Bank v. National Eagle Bank, 101 Mass. 281 (1869), decided during
the same year as the Boylston case, the court remarked that laches do not prevent
recovery. In the Boylston case the drawee delayed several days before notifying the
holder, but this did not seem to play an important part in the court's reasoning.
90. The absence of a mistake of fact resulted in a denial of recovery in Atlas
Nat. Bank v. National Exchange Bank, 176 Mass. 300, 57 N.E. 605 (1900), in which,
after the return hour, the drawee learned that the drawer had made an assignment for
creditors. The case involved notes rather than checks, but there was evidence of a
custom to return unpaid notes by a certain time. The lack of such a custom was responsible for a contrary result in National Exchange Bank v. National Bank of North
America, 132 Mass. 147 (1882). Evidence of a custom varying the hour specified by
clearing house rules has been held admissible. Akron Scrap Iron Co. v. Guardian Say.
& Trust Co., 120 Ohio St. 120, 165 N.E. 715 (1929); Banque Nationale v. Merchants
Bank, 7 Montreal L. R. 336 (1891) (alternative holding).
91. 139 Mass. 513, 2 N.E. 89 (1885).
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ing house, reaching plaintiff about noon. Since B's account showed a
sufficient balance, the check was debited against it, the bank not knowing
that part of the balance arose from the sugar sale. About one o'clock,'
the termination of the period for making returns, the president of the
bank, becoming suspicious, sent the check by messenger to the presenting
bank and demanded repayment. The messenger arrived between 1:07
and 1:12. Defendant bank had not changed its position.
The court granted recovery, pointing out that a mistake of fact
existed in that, unknown to the drawee bank, the amount of B's account
available for withdrawal differed from the amount appearing upon the
books. The absence of negligence on plaintiff's part was also noted by
the court.

2

The "mistake of fact" in Merchants' National Bank v. National
Eagle Bank 93 was of a more peculiar nature. At 12:45, fifteen minutes
before the deadline and in time to reach the defendant bank by one
o'clock, the drawee bank's messenger set forth to return a number of
not good items, including the check in question. He became confused
about the destination of another of the items, and came back to the
drawee bank to be straightened out. As a result, he did not reach the
defendant bank until between 1:05 and 1:07. The court allowed the
drawee to recover on the basis of mistake of fact, declaring that the
circumstances paralleled a payment over-the-counter by mistake.' The
parallel is difficult to follow, for in the principal case there was no intent
at any time to pay the item, and it requires quite a stretch of the imagination to assimilate this to an intentional payment made in ignorance of the
94
true state of affairs.
Perhaps because the court sensed the fallibility of its pronouncement
upon the mistake of fact phase-of the transaction, a good part of the
opinion was devoted to an interpretation of the clearing house rule,
calculated to bring about the result considered equitable by tfhe court. Yet
looking at the opinion as a whole, it does not appear that the court
intended to hold that the rule had been complied with and that, therefore,
the check had never been paid. Rather, it appears in the last analysis,
92. The court distinguished Boylston National Bank v. Richardson, 101 Mass. 287
(1869), supra note 87, upon the ground that the transaction in that case showed laches
rather than mistake of fact.
93. 101Mass. 281 (1869).
94. In Preston v. Canadian Bank of Commerce, 23 Fed. 179 (N.D. Ill. 1883), supra
note 85, the court declared that Merchants' Nat. Bank v. National Eagle Bank went to
the verge in its application of the mistake of fact rule. In the Eagle Bank case the
court also laid some emphasis upon the wording of the clearing house rule. The rule
did not stipulate that items should be retumed by one o'clock; instead, it provided that
checks should not be retained after one o'clock. However, this argument appears to
have been abandoned in the subsequent Massachusetts decisions.
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that the court meant to treat the case as one involving payment under
mistake of fact. 95
Still nearer the border in its application of the mistake of fact
principle is the New York case of CitiZens' CentralNationdi Bank v. New
Amsterdam National Bank. 96 There, the messenger did not become confused, but simply failed to leave the drawee bank soon enough, and, as a
consequence, arrived at the presenting bank between four and ten minutes
late. In allowing recovery, the court lauded the Massachusetts authorities, quoting extensively therefrom and stating that the mistake in the
New York case was the same in kind as that existing in Merchants' NationalBank v. NationalEagleBank.
To bolster its opinion the New York court also resorted to the
wording of the clearing house rule. The rule provided that return of
not good checks "should be made" before three o'clock. The court
opined that those words made the rule advisory rather than mandatory.
It is difficult to tell which ground predominated in the mind of the court.
The New York case and the two Massachusetts cases allowing recovery enjoy one very important factor in common-a factor of no
influence theoretically, but of major significance from a practical standpoint. In each of them the returned item reached the defendant bank
within a very few moments after the deadline. Whether a materially
greater delay, caused, for example, by the messenger's consumption of a
sleeping potion under the mistaken belief that it was a "shot" of coca cola,
would alter the result of the lawsuit in those states, only their courts
can say.97
DEFERRED POSTING LEGISLATION
In view of the clearing house regulations permitting the drawee
bank to return items within certain time limits, and the judicial approval
of such regulations, it may be wondered why legislative action was
necessary. Actually, the need arose from the institution by banks of a
procedure called deferred posting, under which the bookkeepers post the
95. This conclusion is fortified by the remarks of the court in Merchants' Nat.

Bank v. National Bank of the Commonwealth, 139 Mass. 513, 2 N.E. 89 (1885), supra
note 91. That this latter case was based upon the payment by mistake theory is proved
by the measure of damages. Had the court intended to hold that the check was returned
on time, the plaintiff bank would have been entitled to reimbursement for the full amount.
Instead, the court limited recovery to the amount in excess of the sum against which
the depositor was entitled to draw.
96. 128 App. Div. 554, 112 N.Y. Supp. 973 (lst Dep't 1908), aff'd without opinion,
198 N.Y. 520, 92 N.E. 1080 (1910). A vigorous dissenting opinion was written by Judge
Ingraham.
97. For a criticism of the position taken in the Massachusetts and New York
decisions, see Ames, The Doctrine of Price v. Neal, 4 HARV. L. REv. 297, 305 (1891).
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various items on the day after their receipt by the bank.9 s This deferred
posting was an outgrowth of the shortage of personnel and machines
during World War II. Originally conceived as a wartime measure, it
endured after the war because of increasing business, continuing employee
shortage, and the need for more efficient operation.
The posting of items and their return through the clearing house
on the day of receipt requires completion within a few hours of the
entire process of sorting, proving, paying, and dishonoring. The extreme
pressure incident thereto is materially relieved by the delayed posting
process. The process saves time and reduces error, inasmuch as the
bookkeepers may do all their posting at one time without interruption.
It results in neater ledger sheets because of less handling. It improves
employee morale by lessening the pressure and spreading the work more
evenly. As suggested above, it enables the bank to do the same amount
of work with fewer people. With all these and other advantages resulting in increased efficiency and decreased cost of operation, it is small
wonder that deferred posting is now generally in effect. Despite the
fact that deferred posting means later return of dishonored checks, there
appears to be no substantial complaint on the part of bank customers.
It is obvious that under deferred posting, pertinent information.
such as the state of the drawer's account, will not be available until the
day after the check has been received by the bank, and dishonored checks
cannot conveniently be returned until all the previous day's items have
been posted. 99 As a consequence, it is likely that more than twenty-four
hours will elapse between the receipt of the check and its return. To the
uninitiated, this presents no insurmountable problem. The solution apparently lies imply in changing the deadline contained in the clearing
house rule. Indeed, a majority of clearing houses did exactly that without any deleterious results. But many clearing house officials and attorneys feared that under the Negotiable Instruments Law a delay of more
than twenty-four hours would automatically impose liability on the
drawee bank and amount to payment, thereby precluding the right to
98. The factual material on deferred posting and delayed returns was derived from
the following articles: Fitch, Doskey, and Ruhlman, Paying and Posting Delayed i; at
Least Two Cities, 58 BANKERS MONTHLY 347 (1942); Lawson, Clearing The Way For
Deferred Posting, Burroughs Clearing House, June 1948, p. 24; Lawson, Deferred
Posting and Delayed Returns. Banking, Jan. 1949, p. 56; 28 Banks Benefit From Delayed

Posting, 59

BANKERS MONTHLY

the Next Day, 60

BANKERS

197 (1942) ; 90 Clearing Houses Now Return Checks

MONTHLY 197 (1943); New State Law Allows Delayed

Return of Items, 60 BANKERS MONTHLY 256 (1943); 187 Clearing Houses Delay Returns: Six States Have New Laws, 61 BANKERS MONTHLY 57 (1944) ; Members of 279
Clearing Houses Now Benefit From Deferred Posting, Bankers Monthly, Sept. 1948, p.
24; 47 States Now Permit Deferred Posting, Banking, Aug. 1951, P. 43.
99. Note, 50 COL. L. REV. 802, 819 (1950).
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return the check. And in view of the case law in some states, their fears
were not groundless.' 0 0
To retain the practical benefits of deferred posting and delayed
returns, while removing the legal dangers, the American Bankers Association drafted a model deferred posting statute which was completed
in November, 1948. Previously, a few states had adopted similar
statutes. Forty-seven states and the District of Columbia have now
enacted either the model statute or its counterpart, and most clearing
houses have extended their deadlines accordingly.
The model statute gives the drawee bank until midnight of its next
business day after the receipt of an item within which to dishonor or
'refuse payment of the item. As a corollary, it authorizes the bank to
revoke credits and other book entries, return the item, and obtain a
refund of, or credit for, the amount of the item.10 Items received for
immediate payment over the counter are excepted, and provision is made
for the variation of the "effect" of the Act by agreement.
Consideration of the deferred posting legislation leads to the conclusion that it adopts the California rule in allowing revocation of overthe-counter credits; that it dispenses with the necessity, of proving a
custom, or a contract by deposit slip or passbook; that it does not disturb
existing law concerning recovery of money paid under mutual mistake
of fact, as in the case of a forged indorsement; and that its only effect
on clearing house transactions is to legalize a deadline of more than
twenty-four hours for the return of dishonored items, thus bringing the
102
law into conformity with modern banking and clearing house practice.'
100. For an explanation of the legal risks, see Leary, Deferred Posting and Delayed Returns-The Current Check Collection Problem, 62 HAV. L. REV. 905, 917

et seq. (1949); Note, 50 CoL. L. REv. 802, 819 et seq. (1950); Note, 63 A.L.R. 1138
(1929).
101. For a case allowing revocation in an over-the-counter credit transaction
under a deferred posting statute similar to the model statute, see Hansen v. Bank of
America Nat. Trust & Sav. Ass'n, 101 Cal. App.2d 300, 225 P.2d 665 (1950). The
model deferred posting statute is discussed in the article by Leary, supra note 100, at 626.
102. Deferred posting under the proposed Uniform Commercial Code is not treated
in this article. For excellent discussions of the subject, see Leary, Deferred Posting
and Delayed Returns-The Current Check Collection Problei, 62 H v. L. REV. 905
(1949); Notes, 50 COL. L. REV. 802 (1950) ; 59 YALE L.J. 961 (1950) ; Banking, July
1951, p. 79. Since the publication of those materials the final text edition of the Uniform Commercial Code, dated November 1951, has appeared. It contains changes from
previous drafts. The Code now has the approval of the American Law Institute, theCommissioners on Uniform State Laws, and the House of Delegates of the American
Bar Association. The comments on the final text edition have not yet been published.
Deferred posting appears to be authorized, e. g., § 4-301. But cf. § 4-303, relating to stop
payment orders and other matters. Will adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code
entail repeal of present deferred posting statutes?

